The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Washington by Kaminoff, Max
Washington Law Review 
Volume 13 Number 3 
7-1-1938 
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Washington 
Max Kaminoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Max Kaminoff, Comment, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Washington, 13 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 
215 (1938). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol13/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and
STATE BAR JOURNAL
Published Quarterly, in January, April, July and November of Eachl Year,
by the Washington Law Review Association, at the Law School
of the University of Washington, Founded by John T.
Condon, First Dean of the Law School.
SunscBinrON PEIcE: $L20 PEa Ax u m SINGLE COPIES 50C
EuOENE C. LuccooK - - - - Editor-in-Chief
R. H. NOTTMMANN - - - - Associate Editor
JomN W. RiCnA.Ds - - - Business Manager
STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE LAW SCHOOL
KENn=H C. HAWKINS, President
WnwAx M. LowRy, Vice-President
Wui.l & Goucnnu, Note Editor HEIBEuT A. MjonuD, Student Bus. Agr.
William G. Daniels
Daniel W. Galser
Bertil Granberg
Richard A. Hogan
Russell V. Hokanson
James P. Hunter
Winston C. Ingman
Max Kaminoff
Wayne Murray, Jr.
Warren H. Ploeger
Hardyn Soule
Lawrence W. Thayer
Harold M. Tollefson
Arthur T. Wendells
Willard J. Wright
COMMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
IN WASHINGTON
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur., where proof is made
that an injury occurred under certain circumstances, negligence
will be presumed1 from those circumstances. It is the purpose
1As will -be pointed out later, Washington is one of those jurisdictions
which hold that the doctrine of res ipsa 7oquitur merely permits the jury
to draw an ixference of negligence from the circumstances proved. It is
therefore technically incorrect to speak of a "presumption" arising by
virtue of the doctrine, in Washington, but as that language is uniformly
used -by the authorities, and -by the Washington court itself, for the sake
of uniformity of language, "presumption" will be used where "permissible
inference" would 'be more accurate.
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of this comment to discuss the doctrine as it exists in Washington
from the standpoint of: (1) Under what circumstances will the
doctrine be applied; (2) What effect will be given to the doctrine
when it is applied; and (3) Will the applicability of the doctrine
be affected by the plaintiff's pleading and attempting to prove
specific acts of negligence.
Before any presumption can arise the circumstances from which
it is to arise must first be established. In other words, even though
the plaintiff relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for recovery,
he still has the duty of proving those facts and circumstances from
which the inference of negligence is to be drawn. 2  As Harper
puts it, "the plaintiff must still show what happened. The pre-
sumption of res ipsa loquitur relieves him from showing how it
happened.'' 3 For example, the plaintiff who claims that the de-
fendant negligently allowed a barrel of flour to fall on him, must
first prove that a barrel of flour did fall on him, and, that the
barrel of flour fell from a window in the defendant's shop. After
these facts have been established, the presumption will arise, but
not until then.
Thus, in a Washington case, where the plaintiff, while in a
Turkish bath, became unconscious, and in some unexplained man-
ner suffered burns, res ipsa loquitur was held to be inapplicable,
there being no proof of what had rendered him unconscious.' He
may have fallen asleep and then been burned by leaning against
the pipes. "The cause of the accident-the offending instrumen-
tality-must be identified before one charged is put to answer.'' 5
Having established the circumstances surrounding the injury,
the basic element in determining the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur in any specific case, is whether or not the circumstances
are such that normal experience indicates that the injury would
not have happened in the absence of negligence on the part of
2In many of these cases, the plaintiff will have a hard time proving
even these preliminary facts. In Norton v. Pacific Power & Light Co.,
79 Wash. 625, 140 Pac. 905 (1914), therefore, it was held that while the
burden of proving that the gas pipe over which plaintiff had stumbled
belonged to the defendant, was on the plaintiff, since the question of
the company's ownership was "peculiarly within its own knowledge, and
if it 'were not the owner thereof, such fact could easily be proven by
it, . . . we are constrained to view the circumstances as making the
burden rest somewhat more lightly ... than as if proof of the ownership
of the pipe ... was equally available to both parties."
'HARPER, TORTS. (1933) § 77.
'Brothers v. Grays Harbor Bldg. Co., 152 Wash. 19, 276 Pac. 896 (1929).
'McClellan v. Schwartz, 97 Wash. 417, 166 Pac. 783 (1917).
In Parmalee v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry., 92 Wash. 185,
158 Pac. 977 (1916), the plaintiff proved that the deceased, a brakeman,
died as the result of a fall from a train. The presence of a defect on
the train was also proved. There being no proof, however, that the fall
was caused by the defect, res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable, the court
saying: ". . . the proof fails to bring the deceased in contact with the
alleged defect. It shows at best only a possibility."
But compare Lang v. Puget Sound Navigation Co., 189 Wash. 353, 65
P. (2d) 1069 (1937), where an intoxicated passenger died from a fall.
The removable railing of his upper berth was found on the floor. Res
ipsa 7oquitur was applied. ". . . the jury was warranted in inferring
that the railing gave way because the lugs at the end had not been
properly placed in the sockets on the wall."
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the defendant. As the Washington court put it, "The rule is
based upon the apparent fact that the accident could not have
happened without negligence... ; or upon the literal meaning of
the expression, that the thing itself speaks, and shows prima facie
that the .. . [defendant] was negligent."8
'The mere fact of injury is insufficient in itself to raise any
presumption of negligence." The presumption arises from the
circumstances surrounding the injury, and then only when they
"are so unusual and of such a nature that it could not well have
happened" without negligence.8 The circumstances must "speak"
negligence. Where they do, res ipsa loquitur is applicable.9 Where
6DeYoe v. Seattle Electric Co., 53 Wash. 588, 102 Pac. 446 (1909).
'Hawkins v. Fremont St. Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021,
16 L. R. A. 808, 28 Am. St. Rep. 72 (1892); Allen v. Northern Pacific Ry.
Co., 35 Wash. 221, 77 Pac. 204, 66 L. R. A. 804 (1904); Valentine v. North-
ern Pacific Ry. Co., 70 Wash. 95, 126 Pac. 99 (1912); Hogg v. Standard
Lumber Co., 52 Wash. 8, 100 Pac. 151 (1909); Long v. McCabe and Ham.
ilton, 52 Wash. 422, 100 Pac. 1016 (1909); Samardege v. Hurley-Mason
Co., 72 Wash. 459, 130 Pac. 755 (1913) ; Dougan v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.
621, 136 Pac. 1165 (1913); Parmalee v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry., supra, n. 5; Girocamo v. Tribble, 70 Wash. 25, 126 Pac. 67 (1912);
Toler v. N. P. Ry. Co., 97 Wash. 700, 166 Pac. 778 (1917); Brothers v.
Grays Harbor Bldg. Co., supra, n. 4; Haydon v. Bay City Fuel Co., 167
Wash. 212, 9 P. (2d) 98 (1932).
See also the cases cited infra, n. 11.
'Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 Pac. 995, 2 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 836, 111 Am. St. Rep. 990 (1905).
Res ipsa loquitur was applied in the following situations: where
the controller on a street car exploded, Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric Co.,
supra, n. 8; where two street cars, or railroad trains collided, Peterson
v. Seattle Traction Co., 23 Wash. 615, 63 Pac. 539, 53 L. R. A. 586 (1900),
Howe v. Northern Pacific Ry., 30 Wash. 569, 70 Pac. 1100, 60 L. R. A. 949(1902), Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100(1905), Russell v. Seattle, Renton & Southern Ry., 47 Wash. 500, 92 Pac.
288 (1907), Jordan v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry, 47 Wash. 503, 92 Pac. 284 (1907),
Harris v. Puget Sound Electric Ry., 52 Wash. 289, 100 Pac. 838 (1909);
where railroad train 'was derailed, Pate v. Columbia and P. S. Ry. Co., 52
Wash. 166, 100 Pac. 324 (1909); where street car skidded because of
caterpillars on the track and the motorman knew of the danger, Bradley
v. City of Seattle, 160 Wash. 100, 294 Pac. 554 (1930); where auto bus
got out of control, Poropat v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Co., 163
W sh. 78, 299 Pac. 979 (1931); where plaintiff was hurt as a result of
blasting by defendant, Klepsch v. Donald, 8 Wash. 162, 35 Pac. 621 (1894),
Britz v. Houlehan, 77 Wash. 506, 137 Pac. 1035 (1914), Briglio v. Holt &
Jeffrey, 85 Wash. 155, 147 Pac. 877 (1915); where child was hurt by
dynamite caps left by defendant, Crabb v. Wilkins, 59 Wash. 302, 109
Pac. 807 (1910); where consumer got shock while trying to turn on
electric light, Abrams v. City of Seattle, 60 Wash. 356, 111 Pac. 168, 140
Am. St. Rep. 916 (1910); where plaintiff fell down elevator shaft, Moohr
v. Victoria Investment Co., 146 Wash. 251, 262 Pac. 643 (1928); where
scaffolding collapsed, Cleary v. General Contracting Co., 53 Wash. 254,
101 Pac. 888 (1909), Penson v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 73 Wash. 338,
132 Pac. 39, L. R. A. 1915F, 15 (1913); where wheel fell off small truck used
for wheeling iron, Graf v. Vulcan Iron Works, 59 Wash. 325, 109 Pac.
1016 (1910); where handcar used in transporting employees was derailed,
Rosellini v. Salsich Lumber Co., 71 Wash. 208, 128 Pac. '213 (1912).
Falling objects: Anderson v. McCarthy Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398, 95
Pac. 325, 16 L. R. A. (Ni. s.) 931, 126 Am. St. Rep. 870 (1908) (overhead
carrier basket); Gibson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound Ry., 61
Wash. 639 (1911) (rock fell on employee who reasonably relied on state-
ment that the particular spot was safe); Poth v. Dexter-Horton Estate,
140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 374 (1926) (window shade roller). Also, where
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they do not-that is, where they are not "unusual", or where they
leave room for different presumptions,10 res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable."
defendant cranked airplane without blocking the wheels, Genero v. Ewing,
176 Wash. 78, 28 P. (2d) 116 (1934); where defendant maintained an
improperly lighted area adjoining the sidewalk, into which plaintiff fell,
Hanna v. Bodler, 173 Wash. 460, 23 P. (2d) 396 (1933); where head of
mallet came off while being used by patron of amusement park, Wodnik
v. Luna Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941, 42 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1070 (1912); where railing of upper berth gave way, Lang v. Puget Sound
Navigation Co., 189 Wash.b353, 65 P. (2d) 1069 (1937); where defendant's
automobile was on wrong side of street at time of collision, Lauber v.
Lyon, 188 Wash. 644, 63 P. (2d) 389 (1936), Crowe v. O'Rourke, 146
Wash. 74, 262 Pac. 136 (1927), Thomas v. Adams, 174 Wash. 118, 24 P.(2d) 432 (1933); where parked car ran down an incline, Oberg v. Berg,
90 Wash. 435, 165 Pac. 391 (1916), Kolbe v. Public Market Delivery &
Transfer, 130 Wash. 302, 226 Pac. 1021 (1924); where ammonia fumes
escaped from a refrigeration plant, Highland v. Wilsonian Investment Co.,
171 Wash. 34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (1932).
'
0Girocamo v. Tribble, supra, n. 7.
"No presumption of negligence was held to arise in the following
situations:
Where the injury was caused by failure to supply sufficient employees,
Rosin v. Donahar Lumber Co., 63 Wash. 430, 115 Pac. 833, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.)
913 (1911); fire of unknown origin, Hughes v. Oregon Improvement Co.,
20 Wash. 294, 55 Pac. 119 (1898); where customer tripped over scale,
Engdal v. Owl Drug Co., 183 Wash. 100, 48 P. (2d) 236 (1935); injury
caused by defect in floor or stairway, Riley v. Pacific Outfitting Co.,
185 Wash. 497, 55 P. (2d) 1058 (1936); where automobile skidded, Osborne
v. Charbneau, 148 Wash. 359, 268 Pac. 884, 64 A. L. R. 251 (1928), Martin
v. Bear, 167 Wash. 327, 9 P. (2d) 365 (1932); where injury was caused
by jerk of cable car, railroad train, etc., Allen v. N. P. Ry. Co., 35 Wash.
221, 77 Pac. 204, 66 L. R. A. 804 (1904), DeYoe v. Seattle Electric Co., supra,
n. 6, Wile v. Northern Pacific Ry., 72 Wash. 82, 129 Pac. 889, L. R. A. 1916C,
355 (1913), Wade v. North Coast Transportation Co., 165 Wash. 418, 5
P. (2) 985 (1931); in suits against physicians and dentists for malprac-
tice, Hoffman v. Watkins, 78 Wash. 118, 138 Pac. 664 (1914), Inglis v.
Norton, 99 Wash. 570, 169 Pac. 962 (1913), Thomson v. Virginia Mason
Hospital, 152 Wash. 297, 277 Pac. 69 (1929), Brear v. Sweet, 155 Wash.
474, 284 Pac. 803 (1930), Prather v. Downs, 164 Wash. 427, 2 P. (2d) 709(1931), Brant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166, 8 P. (2d) 972 (1932),
Bruginski v. Lane, 177 Wash. 121, 30 P. (2d) 970 (1934), Gross v. Part-
low, 190 Wash. 489, 68 P. (2d) 1034 (1937).
While normally a presumption of negligence arises from the fact of
a parked ear rolling down an incline, supra, n. 9, in Joseph v. Schwartz,
128 Wash. 634, 224 Pac. 5 (1924), where the evidence showed that the
car had stood for five or six hours before moving down the incline,
res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable. While a collision between
two street cars will raise a presumption of negligence, n. 9, supra,
a collision between a street car and an automobile will not. Hoopman
v. City of Seattle, 122 Wash. 379, 210 Pac. 783 (1922). In Lewinn v.
Murphy, 63 Wash. 356, 115 Pac. 740, L.R.A. 1917E, 198, Ann. Cas. 1912D,
433 (1911) where the plaintiff who had been struck by a falling object,
was an employee of the defendant's, res ipsa liquitur was held inapplic-
able, the court holding that while a case in which a pedestrian is hurt by
a falling board "readily falls within the true application of the rule,"
the rule rwould not apply in the case of a worker, the difference being
that in the-case of a pedestrian there is "no possible defense of acts
of fellow servants, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, or any
other that might be applied in the case of an injured employee." But
again, where the facts eliminate blame on the part of the employee,
res ipsa 7oquitur will be applied. LaBee v. Sultan Logging Co., 51 Wash.
81, 97 Pac. 1104, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 405 (1908); Gibson v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & P. S. Ry., 61 Wash. 639, 112 Pac. 919 (1911).
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In addition to the requirement that the circumstances "speak"
negligence, "a circumstance necessary to its application is that
the injured party .. . is not in a position to explain the cause,
while the party charged is in a position where he is, or if he has
exercised reasonable care should be, able to explain and show him-
self free from negligence, if in fact he was so." (Italics sup-
plied) 12 "If the circumstances do not suggest or indicate superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation on the part of the party
charged, or if the plaintiff has equal or superior means of informa-
tion, the doctrine will not apply."1"
Obviously, exclusive control of the offending instrumentality in
the defendant is essential before it can logically be said that the
circumstances suggest negligence on his part, and in order that
he have superior opportunity for explanation. 4 That does not
mean, however, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a physical
actor in bringing about his injuries will bar application of the
doctrine. For when the injury is caused by a defect in the instru-
mentality, if there was no duty on the plaintiff to inspect the
instrument, control will have been in the defendant even though
the plaintiff was the one using the instrumentality at the time of
the injury.:" On the other hand, where the injury was the result
of the way in which the instrumentality was used, then, if the
'Penson v. Inland Empire Paper Co., supra, n. 9.13Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co., 63 Wash. 423, 115 Pac. 838, L. R. A.
1917E, 178 (1911). See also Johnson v. Columbia & P. S. Ry. Co., 74
Wash. 417, 133 Pac. 604 (1913).
The logical result of this requirement is that where an employee
is injured by "an implement of simple structure presenting no com-
plicated question of power, motion, or construction, and intelligible in
all of its parts to the dullest intellect," res ipsa loquitur will not be
applicable, "for there Is no reason known to the law why a person
handling such instrument and brought in daily contact with it, should
not be chargeable equally with the master 'with a knowledge of Its
defects." Cole v. Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 66 Wash. 393, 119 Pac. 831
(1911).
'%... and when the... instrumentality . . . is under the exclusive
control and management of the defendant so that he is in a better posi-
tion to prove his innocence than the plaintiff is to prove his negligence,
there exists a res ipsa 7oquitur case." HAnRPE, ToRTs, (1933) § 77.
'This may be said to be the 'reason' for the rule, and usually takes
the form of the instrument or appliance causing the injury being under
the defendant's control and management. Indeed it has sometimeg been
declared that the instrumentality must have been under the defendant's
exclusive control, otherwise the question of proximate cause compli-
cates the Issue and destroys the presumption -because the injury may
have been as easily due to the negligence of a third person." Heckel
and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1928) 22 Ill.
L. R. 724.
"Thus, the doctrine was applied: Where plaintiff was using the mallet
which injured him, Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., supra, n. 9;
where plaintiff was injured by an awning crank which she was using,
Thornton v. Van Do Kamp's Dutch Bakers, 181 Wash. 213, 42 Pac. 799,(1935).
The justification for this result is that "insofar as the (plaintiff)
was an actor, he was such actor along the lines of the express directions
of the (defendant), and along lines which appellant's express directions
told him that it was safe". Moohr v. Victoria Investment Co., supra,
n. 9 (plaintiff fell down elevator shaft).
'There was no duty of inspection cast upon (the plaintiff) . . .; nor
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plaintiff was the actor, control was in him, and res ipsa loquitur
will obviously be inapplicable.
The prerequisites to the application of the doctrine, then, are:
(1) that the circumstances be such as to logically allow a pre-
sumption of negligence; and (2) that the circumstances suggest
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation on the part of
the party charged. And before these requirements can be said to
exist, exclusive control in the defendant will be essential as a
matter of logic.
Whether the circumstances of a particular case justify the ap-
plication of the doctrine will be decided by the court, as a matter
of law, when the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case is challenged
at the close of his evidence; by a motion for non-suit or for a
directed verdict; or when the plaintiff requests that the jury be
instructed that res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
Having determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
properly applicable in a specific case, three possible effects might
be given to it. First, it might be held to merely furnish some evi-
dence of negligence, thereby getting the plaintiff past a non-suit
and making a case for the jury. Secondly, it might be held to
establish a prima facie case for the plaintiff which will entitle him
to a directed verdict in the absence of any explanation by the de-
fendant.1 In this situation, the burden of proof remains on the
plaintiff, but the burden of going ahead with the evidence shifts
to the defendant. Finally, some jurisdictions hold that the doc-
trine has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the de-
fendant.
7
The Washington decisions abound with statements to the effect
that the presumption which arises when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applied, shifts the "burden" to the defendant.'8 Yet,
was the truck in his exclusive use or control. Its use was a mere inci-
dent to his main employment. It is apparent that the (defendant) did
not intend such a waste of time or energy (inspection by employees of
equipment which they used only occasionally as a mere incident to their
main employment)". Graff v. Vulcan Iron Works, supra, n. 9 (where
wheel came off a truck which the plaintiff was using to wheel iron
around).
But when the circumstances indicate that the employee has, or is
chargeable with equal or superior knowledge to that of the employer,
res ipsa loquitur will not be applicable. Supra, notes 12 and 13.
20Regardless of the effect given to the doctrine, in order to rebut
the presumption which has arisen, the defendant's explanation, of
course, must be such that it negatives the inference of negligence, if
uncontested. Thus, in Hayes v. Staples, 129 Wash. 436, 225 Pac. 417
(1924), though the defendant proved the accident 'was caused by the
breaking of a channel lock on one of the wheels of the conveyance,
he was not entitled to a directed verdict because that fact alone would
not relieve him from liability. There still remained open the question
of whether or not he had exercised proper care in looking after the
lock, etc.
"HARPER, ToRTs, (1933) § 77; Heckel and Harper, supra, n. 14.
"
8 The language of the court has varied:
"It then became the duty of the defendant to meet this prima facie
case." Rosellini v. Salsich Lumber Co., supra, n. 9; "the burden of
explanation," Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., supra, n. 9;
"... there has ,been an absolute failure to sustain the burden of proof
thus imposed upon it," Russell v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., supra, n. 9; "the
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when that. question was directly before the court in Briglio v. Holt
and Jeffery 9 the court said:
"The proper instruction as to the application of the
presumption would be this: The jury should be instructed
that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish
all the controverted allegations of his complaint by a fair
preponderance of the evidence; that when a situation is
shown which necessarily infers negligence on the part of
the defendant, or res ipsa loqutur, the burden then de-
volves upon the defendant to furnish an explanation or
rebuttal of that presumption of negligence by producing
evidence of his due care and proper caution, under the
circumstances and conditions necessarily within the de-
fendant's exclusive control. If then, after considering
such explanation, on the whole case and on all the issues
as to negligence, injury and damages, the evidence still
preponderates in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover, otherwise not." (Italics supplied.)
In other words, the "burden" referred to in the Washington
cases is merely the burden of going forward with the evidence.
"This burden should not be confused with the burden of making
the better case as between the plaintiff and the defendant. The
plaintiff must have made the better case in the end by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. ' 20  The burden of proof is not af-
fected.
21
And even though the burden of going forward with the evidence
has shifted to the defendant, his failure to rebut, or to even at-
tempt to rebut, the plaintiff's prima facie case, will not result in
a directed verdict for the plaintiff, in Washington. The actual
effect given to the doctrine in this jurisdiction was stated by the
court in the following unequivocal language:
" 'In our opinion, res ipsa oquitur means that the facts
of occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not
burden of exculpatory explanation," Penson v. Inland Empire Paper Co.,
supra, n. 9.
These statements have misled as eminent an authority as Prof.
Harper to state that Washington is one of those jurisdictions which
hold that the application of the doctrine results in a shifting of the
burden of proof.
"Supra, n. 9.
20Abrams v. City of Seattle, supra, n. 9.
"The doctrine does not dispense with the rule that the party who
alleges negligence must prove it. It merely determines the mode of
proving it, or what shall be prima facie evidence of negligence." Penson
v. Inland Empire Paper Co., supra, n. 9.
"The doctrine is, in its application, no more than proof by circum-
stantial evidence." McClellan v. Schwartz, supra, n. 5.
Cf. Long v. 'McCabe & Hamilton, supra, n. 7.
2*Harper approves of such a result. Once the defendant has ex-
plained how the accident happened "the parties are in precisely the
same position that they would occupy in any negligence case". Any
other result, instead of merely relieving the plaintiff of a disadvantage,
would actually give him an unfair advantage over the defendant, and
would be "distinctly erroneous". HARPEB, TOnTs, (1933) § 77.
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that they compel such an inference; that they furnish cir-
cumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence
of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not
necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for
explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require
it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not
that they forestall the verdict. Res ipsa loquitur, where
it applies, does not convert the defendant's general issue
into an affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in,
the question for the jury is, whether the preponderance
is with the plaintiff.' Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S.
233, 33 S. Ct. 416, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905."
"If this case had been tried to a jury, rather than the
court, the rule of res ipsa loquitur would have carried the
case beyond a non-suit to the jury, but the weight of the
inference would thereafter be for the jury, as it was in
this case for the trial court.
' 2
Thus, in Washington, the plaintiff who establishes a res ipsa
case may not be non-suited. He has made a case for the jury.
But the weight of the inference is for the jury to determine. - It
may find against the plaintiff even though the defendant has
offered no explanation. 23  This represents the weakest of the three
possible effects which might have been given to the doctrine.
Since, as we have seen, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is ap-
plicable only where the plaintiff is not in a position to explain
how the accident occurred, does he lose the benefit of the doctrine
if he also pleads and attempts to prove, specific acts of negligence?
The Washington court has held that he does not. "The plaintiff
is not to be deprived of the case her pleadings and proofs made
"Genero v. Ewing, supra, n. 9.
Accord: "The doctrine . . . means that the jury . . . are warranted
in finding . . .", Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., supra, n. 9; "it
may be inferred from the facts," Abrams v. City of Seattle, supra, n. 9;
"it was a reasonable and natural inference which the jury would be
warranted in deriving from the facts," Crabb v. Wilkins, supra, n. 9;
"the case should have been submitted for the jury to say whether
negligence of the defendant was established," Anderson v. McCarthy Dry
Goods, supra, n. 9; "The evidence, if believed to be true, would have
warranted the jury in returning a verdict in favor of respondents (plain-
tiffs)," Hanna v. Bodler, supra, n. 9.
2In the Genero case, supra, n. 9, the court went on to say that "a
careful reading of the record does not warrant a reversal of the trial
court's findings. . . . we cannot say that the evidence preponderates
against its findings". The inference is clear that under the proper cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff would be entitled to a directed verdict. There
is no logical reason why that should not be so. That is, where the
inference is so strong that reasonable minds could not differ, and the
defendant offers no explanation, or an obviously inadequate one, a
verdict in favor of the defendant would be contra to the evidence. "The
doctrine is . . . no more than circumstantial evidence." McClellan v.
Schwartz, supra, n. 5. However, no case has been found in Washington,
in which the plaintiff, on this ground, was held to be entitled to a directed
verdict. So while such a result may be theoretically possible in this
jurisdiction, in the usual situation, the result will be as indicated
above.
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merely because she alleged a stronger case than she was able to
prove." 2
4
There seems to be no logical reason why the result should be
otherwise. The doctrine, in effect, says that under certain circum-
stances, an inference of negligence is valid. Why should that
validity be affected by the plaintiff's attempt to prove specific
acts of negligence, keeping in mind the fact that this applies only
when the plaintiff's attempts to prove the specific acts are unsuc-
cessful? Once the actual cause of the injury is established beyond
controversy, of course, whether by the plaintiff or by the defend-
ant, no presumptions will be involved.2 5 An unsuccessful attempt
to prove specific acts is not inconsistent with the requirement of
inferior knowledge or lack of knowledge on the part of the plaintiff.
On the contrary, it constitutes proof of his lack of knowledge.
And if the injured plaintiff, in his perfectly justifiable effort to
make as strong a case as possible, makes an unsuccessful effort to
prove specific acts of negligence, why should the defendant, who
by hypothesis knows what happened, escape liability by merely
disproving the plaintiff's specific allegations? If the inference
of negligence is good when the plaintiff doesn't plead and attempt
to prove specific acts, there is no logical reason why it isn't just
as good when he does. In either case, the defendant who is in
possession of the facts, should have the burden of explaining what
happened or of taking the risk of an adverse verdict on the basis
of the presumption. The Washington doctrine seems sound.26
To summarize, then, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will be
applied, in Washington, in any negligence case where (1) the
circumstances surrounding the injury axe such that normal ex-
perience indicates that it would not have happened in the absence
of negligence, and (2) the circumstances suggest superior knowl-
edge on the part of the defendant. When applied, a case for the
jury has been made. And finally, the doctrine will be applied,
under the proper circumstances, even though the plaintiff pleaded
and attempted to prove specific acts of negligence in addition.
While one may at times be inclined to disagree with the court's
decision as to the applicability of the doctrine in certain factual
situations, the legal principles which the court has laid down as
governing the application of, and the legal effect to be given to,
the doctrine, appear to be sound.
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